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THELMA AND LOUISE AND THE LAW: DO
RAPE SHIELD RULES MATTER?
Ann Althouse*
Louise: "Just what do you think we should tell them? Just
about a hundred people saw him dancing with you
cheek to cheek "
Thelma: "Tell them he was raping me..."
Louise: "We don't live in that kind of a world Thelma."'
Thelma and Louise drive away from a bad marriage, a lukewarm
lover, rape and a murdered rapist, through an oppressively phallic ter-
rain of mountains and oil wells and gas pumps and tank trucks and rock
monuments and exploitative men. They reach the Grand Canyon, where
the landscape opens up, female and concave. At first they back away. It
seems impossible to go on. The male forces-cars, rifles, police-con-
verge on them. Demanding surrender, one of the men shouts through his
bullhorn, "Any failure to obey that command will be considered an act
of aggression against us."
Earlier in the film, Louise told her lover, "It's time to just let go of
the old mistakes. Just chalk it up to bad timing. It's time to let go."2
And Thelma has said, "Something's like... crossed over in me and I...
I can't go back."3 Now Thelma says, "Let's keep going.., go!" They
* Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; B.F.A., 1973, University of
Michigan; J.D., 1981, New York University.
1. THELMA AND LOUISE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1991) (written by Callie Khouri; di-
rected by Ridley Scott).
2. Louise's lover, Jimmy, is a rock musician whom we see in his apartment cramped with
his exercise machines, electronic music equipment and a large dog. Having avoided commit-
ment for a long time, Jimmy responds to Louise's flight by presenting her with an engagement
ring in a dingy motel room. Louise explains to Thelma, "He's no different than any other guy.
He just loves the chase."
3. Going back for Thelma would mean returning to a suffocating marriage to a man who
lacks the slightest understanding of her wants and needs. We see the husband, Darryl, in the
dark brown interior of his living room, drinking beer, watching football, surrounded by foot-
ball trophies and an old pinball machine. Consider, along with this image of Thelma's husband
and the image of Louise's lover described in the preceding footnote, the picture of the police
station (decorated with rows of toy soldiers), the crowded, airless bar where Thelma meets her
rapist, the succession of seedy diners, motel rooms and stores, and the monumental western
rock formations, looking claustrophobic, as photographed at night. In the visual logic of the
movie, their final flight over and into the canyon is right, because only dark, grimy, cluttered
men's spaces lie behind them, while the image of them and the Thunderbird in the sky is fully
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kiss, join hands and drive the metallic green Thunderbird out into thin
air. There, they remain frozen in time. The screen bleaches to white
and, given cinematic magic, they transcend the world of men and enter
into the sublime. The world to Thelma and Louise is a world of men.
Men's interests, men's values, men's interpretations4 and men's laws hold
sway. They could only break free by racing out of the world entirely: a
depressing thought.'
I.
Most lawmakers, lawyers and law professors like to view law as a
neutral mechanism that they can adjust to serve whatever goals they de-
cide to embrace,6 not a device permanently tuned to the interests of any
particular group. It may have been that the law protected the interests of
men in sexual access to women when it allowed those accused of rape to
impeach their accusers (and deter accusations) by permitting extensive
cross-examination into the victim's intimate relations. But lawmakers
heard the critiques women made, and they responded with rape shield
statutes that take an, aggressively exclusionary stance. Does that demon-
bright. Cf KEIKO I. McDONALD, THE DIALECTIC OF LIGHT AND DARKNESS IN
KUROSAWA'S Rashomon (1983) (Donald Richie ed., 1990).
4. In the Senate confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas, one Senator after another
used a male standard of behavior to generate doubt about the truth of Professor Anita Hill's
testimony. Why would anyone continue to work with a man who had sexually harassed her?
Why would she follow him to the next job and maintain cordial relations with him over the
years? Why would she not file a legal complaint at the time the events occurred? Hearing
these questions raised over and over, one felt a sense of futility. The problem was not the
evidence, but the frame of mind of those who would interpret it.
5. Many women do not find the ultimate flight into the air depressing at all. One need
not see their final leap as suicidal, and indeed, the film-maker's decision to deprive us of the
sight of a fiery wreck on the floor of the canyon encourages us to make a different interpreta-
tion. Viewing the ending symbolically, one can say that Thelma and Louise drastically cut all
ties with men and male-dominated institutions and see their future in alliance with each other
and with the Feminine (embodied by the canyon). This interpretation explains the exhilara-
tion many women viewers experience.
In the original version of the movie, the women (and the car) actually survive the landing
in the Grand Canyon and, presumably, successfully escape to Mexico. See John Horn, Screen
Test: Relying on Audience Research, Hollywood Cuts Risks and Creativity, Wisc. STATE J.,
Sept. 22, 1991, at 61. Preview audiences reportedly rejected this lapse in verisimilitude and the
ending was changed, though not to the point where we see the death at the bottom of the
canyon. We see them airborne and then by way of a flashback montage, happy and free to-
gether in the past. Interestingly, other lapses in verisimilitude escaped revision: we are shown
Thelma, almost immediately after her rape/attempted rape, discovering bliss in sexual inter-
course-and with a stranger/hitchhiker/admitted armed robber! Reviewers, however, took
note: "When Thelma takes up with an attractive young hitch-hiker.., good sex has as magi-
cal an effect on her as any male chauvinist pig could wish." Adam Mars-Jones, Getting away
from It All, THE INDEPENDENT, July 12, 1991, at 18.
6. See LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 13-14 (3d ed. 1988).
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strate that the law is not inherently bound to the service of male
interests?
In Thelma and Louise, Slocumbe,7 the "good cop," embodies this
idealized concept of law. A more cynical character refers to him as "Mr.
Johnny Fucking Law."' Slocumbe cares about the women and tries to
reach out to them. He does not want to see them hurt and tells them so,
in his kindly, paternal telephone voice. He knows about the trauma of
rape. He knows that like Thelma, Louise was also raped.' He purports
to understand how their experience has driven their actions. He seems
eager to incorporate extenuating circumstances particular to women into
the application of the law. He decries the use of excessive force against
them: he does not want the FBI called in; there are too many police cars;
the guns are not necessary. In the end, he runs toward them, risking the
aimed rifles at his back, holding one arm outstretched. He wants them to
engage with him, trust him, negotiate their way out. He portrays himself
as the only hope that does not lead to violence and destruction.
But Thelma and Louise reject his overtures and leave him behind
along with all the men who did not try to understand or help them.
Symbolically, they take the position that even the help and protection
that men offer is suspect and tainted with patriarchy. (Slocumbe does
refer to them relentlessly as "girls," and his kindly telephone conversa-
tions provide the means for tracing their whereabouts.) The law may
7. The name, pronounced "slow come," is a pun that suggests that the help men offer
would take the form of better sex. This suggestion is made quite loudly in the series of scenes
involving the hitchhiker "J.D." Thelma's night of "great sex" with J.D. transforms her from a
nervous housewife, who can only swig her Wild Turkey from tiny, one-serving-size bottles, to a
powerful and composed woman capable of carrying out a well-orchestrated robbery and drink-
ing her Wild Turkey from a full-sized bottle. (To drive home the causal connection, Thelma
kicks the tiny bottles off the motel-room dresser during her rousing sexual encounter with
J.D.) After her great sex, of which Louise murmuringly approves ("Oh, darlin', I'm so happy
for you, that's great, I really am. You finally got laid properly. It's so sweet."), Thelma's
voice, manner and even hairstyle are radically transformed. Thelma is soon enough disap-
pointed by J.D., who absconds with their money, but Thelma does seem jolted with power
after this experience. It is not the rape that sears her consciousness and changes her way of
acting in the world, but the great sex. The initial run from the law is motivated not by the
rape, but by the murder, an action taken by Louise, whom Thelma more or less follows.
Thelma becomes the dominant actor, robbing the convenience store, disarming the state
trooper, and suggesting the drive into the canyon, only after the sexual encounter with J.D.
8. The "cynical character" referred to is J.D., the hitchhiker Thelma and Louise pick up.
J.D. translates easily to "juvenile delinquent," emphasizing the character's antagonism to the
law (he is also a robber). Slocumbe, questioning him about Thelma and Louise, tells J.D., "I
have no feeling for you." Ironically, Slocumbe takes to beating J.D. about the head during
interrogation, distinctly marring his "good cop" persona. (The niceties of constitutional police
questioning have never been Hollywood's forte.)
9. On the telephone, he says, "Louise, I'll do anything. I know what's making you run. I
know what happened to you in Texas."
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sound as though it can provide a solution, but women should not trust it.
Slocumbe is left behind along with the other men: the good, idealized
view of law is rejected as just one more male-dominated institution."°
II.
Before rape shield rules came into being, juries heard an immense
amount of detail about the alleged victim's sex life. The defense com-
monly adopted the strategy of casting doubt on her'1 characterization of
the event in question by encouraging the jury to infer that if the victim
had consented to sexual activity in the past it is more likely that she
consented on this occasion as well.' 2 Even if there were some slight cor-
relation between prior consent and consent on a particular occasion, the
circumstances surrounding the event in question have far more probative
value. Although under the Federal Rules evidence is deemed relevant if
it has "any tendency" to affect the determination of a "fact of conse-
quence,"13 the great danger is that jurors will overrate the evidence.
They may assume a willingness to consent to sexual activity far beyond
what is realistic; sexually active women reject many would-be sexual
partners. More importantly, details about the event in question can en-
tirely cancel the probative value of an inference based on past behavior; if
the defendant was a stranger or used a weapon or acted in concert with
others, past sexual encounters with individual, nonviolent acquaintances
become utterly irrelevant. Jurors may also succumb to the temptation to
disregard the judge's instructions: they may decide that rape does not
harm a sexually active woman enough to warrant criminal punishment.
When evidence hurts the factfinding process more than it helps-when
"the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice"-the judge should exclude it. 4 Thus, it seems apparent that
10. As one despairing reviewer puts it, "'Thelma & Louise' makes a grandiose spectacle of
rejecting reason." Gary Arnold, Fires, Females, Felons, Fat Folks, Phooeyl; Moronic
"Thelma" Bombs as Comic Davis Captivates, WASH. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at El.
11. By use of the feminine personal pronoun, I do not mean to suggest that men are not
raped, only that female rape victims greatly predominate over male. I do not want to flatten
out this reality by neutralizing my pronouns. The female personal pronoun can today easily be
read as representing a genderless subject. I intend the female pronouns to carry their tradi-
tional meaning.
12. For criticism of this practice, see SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); Vivian Berger,
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-
15 (1977).
13. FED. R. EVID. 401.
14. FED. R. EVID. 403. Other rules in Article IV follow the same principle as they iden-
tify specific categories of evidence that present recurring problems of balancing prejudicial and
probative values.
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judges should have excluded most evidence of past sexual behavior even
without a rape shield rule."
If jurors were perfectly attuned to the reality of sexual relations in
general and rape in particular, they would not overvalue the evidence. If
they really could use it for nothing more than its scintilla of value, free
from any unfair prejudice, then no exclusion to protect the factfinding
process would be needed. A judge, living alongside of these jurors in this
Utopia, would understand the jurors' impressive capacities, though he or
she should nevertheless exclude the evidence as a waste of time1 6 or as a
way to protect the witness from harassment.17 But nonresidents of Uto-
pia labor under various and unpredictable prejudices and misconcep-
tions. Living in the same society, judges will share many of their
prejudices and thought processes. 8 Not only will jurors overvalue evi-
dence of past sexual behavior in their deliberations, judges will view the
prejudicial inferences as appropriate and therefore an aspect of probative
value weighing in favor of admissibility, not against it. The reasoning
processes of the human mind do not come from rules of evidence. A rule
may say "probative value" and "unfair prejudice," but a human mind,
subject to prejudice, must assign these labels to the proffered evidence. If
the same misconceptions that impair the jury impair the judge, the judge
cannot screen out evidence that jurors will misuse.
If a human mind, steeped in a particular social context, must apply
the rules of evidence, then one should perhaps despair at the prospect of
controlling the treatment of rape cases with rules of evidence. The prom-
15. These judges did not dramatically undermine the arguments of those who opine that
we may do without rape shield rules because the existing rules already dictate exclusion of all
the evidence that should be excluded. See, eg., J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino,
Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 590 (1981).
16. FED. R. EVID. 403. Waste of time is one of the counterweights to probative value that
the judge may consider under Rule 403.
17. Rule 611(a)(3) authorizes the judge to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment." FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(3). Note, too, that in the
imagined Utopia, the defense lawyer would lack motivation to offer the questionable evidence
in the first place.
18. The chief difference would seem to be the judge's greater contact with rape cases (as
well as other legal cases). Through his or her life experience, which has taken place in large
part in a courtroom, the judge may have developed a heightened power to assess the truth of
testimony, a more jaundiced view of human nature, and a more callous attitude toward the
consequences of criminal punishment. In GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989), Professor LaFree reports that
judges as a general rule are more likely to find a rape defendant guilty and thus frequently
disagree with the jury verdicts returned in their courtrooms. Id. at 95-96, 199. A judge with
this experience, one would think, would tend to mistrust the jury's ability to weigh evidence
properly and might attempt to control their miscalculations by excluding evidence.
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ise of law reform resembles the good cop Slocumbe running toward us
with an arm outstretched in an offer of help. Like Thelma and Louise,
should we head full speed in the opposite direction, turning our back on
the institution of law, even when it appears understanding and enlight-
ened and willing to help? Should we say that even the attempts at help
are part of a larger, overbearing system that only shifts around its modes
of oppressing women? Should we leap into the Thunderbird and drive
on?
III.
Most exclusionary rules premised on a comparison of prejudice and
probative value only forbid a specific purpose. 19 For example, Federal
Rule of Evidence 404 forbids evidence of character only if it is used "for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion. ' 2° The very same evidence is allowed if the proponent can ar-
ticulate some other purpose.21 Rape shield rules, such as Federal Rule of
Evidence 412,22 follow a much more restrictive structure, flatly barring
the category of evidence of past sexual behavior and providing only a
short list of exceptions.23 Other Article IV rules invite circumvention
through the articulation of an alternate purpose, but rape shield rules
convey a much stronger exclusionary message to the judges who must
apply them.24
Rule 412, like its state law counterparts, is buttressed with addi-
tional safeguards. It completely bars evidence in the form of reputation
and opinion evidence, without exception.25 It requires a rape defendant
who seeks to use evidence of past sexual behavior to make a written mo-
tion at least fifteen days before trial (unless that evidence is "newly dis-
19. These rules appear in Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., FED. R.
EvID. 403, 404(a), 404(b), 407-412.
20. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). If the forbidden use of the evidence "substantially out-
weighs" the permissible use, Rule 403 bars it. FED. R. EVID. 403.
22. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
23. See, eg., FED. R. EVID. 412(b). For example, the exeptions enumerated in Rule 412
are: evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior offered to establish the source of the semen or
injury and evidence of past sexual behavior with the accused offered on the issue of consent.
When one of the exceptions applies, specific instances of past sexual behavior are the only
permissible form of proof. However, the Constitution has supremacy over a mere statute, such
as the Federal Rules of Evidence (or any state rule or state constitutional provision), and thus
it remains open for a court to hold that the Constitution requires proof in the forbidden form.
See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
24. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 412.
25. FED. R. EvID. 412(b).
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covered"), with service to the alleged victim as well as the other parties.2 6
It provides for an in camera hearing to determine whether the proffered
evidence fits within an exception; facts upon which relevancy depends
must be fulfilled at this point, rather than over the course of the trial as
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) generally permits.27 Contrary to the
balancing test of Rule 403, weighted distinctly in favor of admissibility,28
the rape shield rule requires evidence within the exceptions to have a
probative value that outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.2 9  Fi-
nally, it permits evidence of specific instances and cross-examination of
the alleged victim only to the extent specified in a judicial order.30
Given the strong message of exclusion conveyed by the text of rape
shield rules and the clear legislative history full of consideration for the
complaining witness, one would expect this rule to make a striking differ-
ence. Certainly, if rules matter, this rule should matter. Most of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (and state evidence codes modelled after
them) accord the trial judge leeway to either admit or exclude much evi-
dence.3 ' To say that these rules "don't matter" is only to say that these
rules represent a decision to invest trial judges with discretion, not that
rules generally lack power to constrain judges. But rape shield rules rep-
resent a clear attempt to rein in the usual discretion: they reflect a mis-
trust of judges (not just juries). Recognizing that the judge who shares
the jurors' prejudices will not use his or her discretion to exclude the
evidence jurors will misuse, rape shield rules set up a restrictive structure
distinctly different from the rest of the rules of evidence.
But as long as prejudice, misconception and sexism persist in the
minds of judges and jurors, can a mere rule, even a rule as strongly
worded as this, have its intended effect? Has the rule succeeded in creat-
ing the kind of atmosphere of safety and trust that will encourage women
to report the crime of rape and to serve as witnesses in rape trials? Or is
the shield rule a nice gesture, an outstretched hand of the legislature, that
seen against the backdrop of the judges and juries that "just don't get
26. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1).
27. FED. R. EviD. 104(b), 412(c)(2).
28. FED. R. EvID. 403 (prejudicial danger must "substantially outweigh" probative value).
29. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).
30. Id.
31. The broad theory of admissibility is expressed clearly in Rules such as 401 and 601.
FED. R. EviD. 401, 601. Discretion to exclude evidence is found, most importantly, in FED.
R. EVID. 403. While exclusionary rules remain, the rules leave room for judges to reclaim
their discretion: for example the Federal Rules preserve the rule against hearsay, FED. R.
EvID. 802, but in addition to the specific exceptions, they also create open-ended, discretionary
exceptions in Rules 803(24), 804(5). See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(5).
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it,"" inspire women only to slam down the accelerator and speed awayfrom the legal process?
IV.
One cannot simply rely on the promise of the rule because a judge or
jury that does not share the goals and beliefs embodied in the rule can
drastically undercut its effect. First, judges can give a generous interpre-
tation to the exceptions found in the rape shield rules, 33 and they can
trump the provisions of the rules with expansive definitions of constitu-
tional rights.34 Assessing the weight of the proffered evidence is part of
32. "[They] just don't get it" became somewhat of a catch phrase during the Thomas
confirmation hearings. See Linda Winer, They're Still Not Getting the Point, NEWSDAY, Nov.
8, 1991, 11-71; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
33. Rape shield statutes vary from state to state. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV.
763, 773 (1986) (cataloguing and analyzing forms of statutes in various states). The basic form
bars all evidence of past sexual behavior and then lists several exceptions, such as, for example,
evidence offered to show that another person caused physical injury or was the source of semen
or evidence of past sexual behavior with the accused. See FED. R. EVID. 412. Some rape
shield statutes, like Federal Rule of Evidence 412, specify an exception for "constitutionally
required" evidence, id., but under the Supremacy Clause, a constitutional right will take prece-
dence over any mere evidence rule, state or federal, whether the rule acknowledges that or not.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Failure to acknowledge the hierarchy of the Supremacy Clause
might risk facial invalidation, but courts have shown their ability to override the rule on a case
by case basis, thus preserving the evidentiary rule. The primary question, then, becomes
whether the Constitution requires this sort of evidence, an inquiry that hinges not merely on
the expansiveness of a judge's definition of constitutional rights, but on how probative the
judge thinks the evidence is. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
34. There is scant Supreme Court case law on these issues. The key confrontation case,
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), held that a state law privilege shielding a juvenile's
records had to yield to the criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses. Id. at 320. Yet
Davis cannot be read to mean that all privileges will always yield to assertions of the right of
confrontation. As Professor Vivian Berger discusses in her article Man's Trial, Woman's Trib-
ulation, Davis emphasizes the relevance of the evidence in question to the issue of bias, which
is seen as presenting a particularly strong need for cross-examination. Berger, supra note 12,
at 52-53; see, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (limitations of FED. R. EVID.
608(b) barring use of specific instances to show character for truthfulness not applicable to
establishing bias).
Moreover, Davis refers to an evidence rule based on privilege, that is, a rule designed to
further social interest extrinsic to the factfinding process at trial. Some commentators
recharacterize the rape shield statute as a rule of privilege, either because it can be viewed as
embodying a social policy to protect rape victims and encourage the reporting of rape or be-
cause such a recharacterization renders it amenable to an attack premised on Davis. See Frank
Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245,
1272-73 (1989). This recharacterization reflects a belief that a significant amount of the ex-
cluded evidence is probative, but is excluded for reasons having little or nothing to do with the
accuracy of the factfinding process. Seeing the rule as one of relevance and countervailing
prejudice (as its placement in Federal Rules of Evidence Article IV suggests) reflects the belief
that the evidence is excluded because it is worthless or likely to distort the factfinding process
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the constitutional analysis. Thus, if the judge thinks the evidence of past
sexual behavior has strong probative value, it becomes more likely that
the right to confront the witness or the due process right to present evi-
dence will require its admission. The judicial mind, subject to prejudice
and distorted assumptions, must assess how probative evidence of past
sexual behavior is, and constitutional decision-making follows accord-
ingly, overriding the detailed exclusions of the evidence rule.
Rape shield rules cannot simply outlaw this kind of decision-mak-
ing. Nevertheless, they convey a strong message to judges that many
persons who have considered the relevance of past sexual behavior have
reached the conclusion embodied in the rape shield rule.3" Knowing this,
a judge may become more likely to agree and assign the evidence low
probative value and consequently reject the constitutional claim. On the
other hand, a judge could still maintain independent doubt about that
conclusion, particularly if he or she sees the statute as a mere political
move, dismissive of the rights of the criminally accused and intended to
more than enhance it. Anyone taking the position that the rape shield rule really belongs in
Article IV where the legislators placed it, along with the other relevance rules, would naturally
view Davis as only tangentially applicable.
The key case on the right to present evidence ("compulsory process") is Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). According to the Court in Chambers, when the evidence
"bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" and was "critical" to the defense, the trial
court could not apply the hearsay rule "mechanistically" to exclude the evidence. Id. at 302.
But Chambers presented evidence that if believed would necessarily exculpate the defendant:
another person had confessed to the murder with which the defendant was charged. Id. at
287. By contrast, the rape shield rule only excludes evidence that could be the basis of an
inference helpful to the defendant. See FED. R. EvID. 412. Moreover, in Chambers, the evi-
dence was unusually strong, in that the person who confessed had signed a sworn statement for
the police; the Court acknowledged that hearsay confessions are frequently excluded. Cham-
bers, 410 U.S. at 287, 298. Indeed, the statement against penal interest exception to the hear-
say rule is relatively new and it only permits the use of such statements to exculpate the
accused if "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The Court in Chambers affirmed "the respect traditionally ac-
corded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules
and procedures," and emphasized the fact-specific nature of its determination that Chambers
had not received a fair trial. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03. Thus, Chambers can scarcely be
read as standing for the general proposition that the accused has a due process right to present
"relevant" or even "fairly probative" evidence.
35. A study of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys indicated their willingness to
express general beliefs that evidence of past sexual behavior lacks probative value, see Cassia
Spohn & Karen Homey, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is Fair:" Rape Shield Laws and Offi-
cials'Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 157-58 (1991). But ver-
balizing agreement with the general principle underlying the rule and rigorously applying the
rule in practice are two different things. A judge may say what the rule has made him or her
think is the appropriate thing to say but still may easily find that a particular bit of evidence
has unusual weight in a given case.
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appease a powerful group or to make a show of crime control.36 If so,
the judge can interpret either the rule's exceptions or the defendant's
constitutional rights to minimize the effect of its general ban on the use of
evidence of sexual behavior.37
Even if the judge does adhere to the rule's strict exclusion of this
evidence, a problem remains. The tendency to focus a rape trial on the
victim's behavior, to make the victim look and feel as if she is on trial,
and to deflect attention from the defendant's behavior can simply take a
different form. Even if the judge restricts the inquiry to evidence of the
event upon which the charge in a particular case is based, the victim can
still be questioned accusingly about her behavior.38  Insinuations about
her "moral character" can encourage the jury to conclude that the de-
fendant should go free because the victim does not deserve the law's pro-
tection. If judges and jurors do not take rape seriously, do not trust
women who report rape or do not think "unchaste" women should be
permitted to invoke the protection of the criminal law, these notions will
infect their interpretation of evidence relating to the event in question.39
Juries will hear about how the witness dressed,' where she voluntarily
went walking alone, how she accepted an invitation, say, to go for a walk
36. See, eg., Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 15, at 544-50 ("[E]ven as the old laws were
premised on the myths of a male-dominated society, the vituperative attacks and much of the
legislation are themselves based on an emotional premise: that the rape victim is unfairly
subject to a 'second rape' by the criminal justice system.").
37. See, e.g., Leo A. Farhat & Richard C. Kraus, Michigan's "Rape Shield" Statute:
Questioning the Wisdom of Legislative Determinations of Relevance, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 545,
558 (1987). Mssrs. Farhat and Kraus approve of the Michigan courts' interpretation of the
state's strict rape shield statute to permit evidence that is clearly excluded by its text. They
write: "The history of Michigan's rape-shield statute should raise concerns about further legis-
lative intrusions into the traditionally judicial functions of weighing probative value and deter-
mining admissibility of evidence." Id. Professors Tanford and Bocchino write that the
Constitution bars special rules relating to past sexual behavior and demands that the judge
subject the evidence to the same weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect that
applies to evidence not covered by a special rule. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 15, at
589. For an empirical study of the tendency to override rape shield rules when evidence seems
more relevant than the usual general character information, see Spohn & Homey, supra note
35. For a recent comprehensive survey of cases, see Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutional-
ity of "Rape Shield" Statute Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1
A.L.R.4th 283 (1980 & Supp. 1991).
38. See, eg., Kristin Bumiler, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and
Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. RV. 75, 79-80 (1987) (describing treatment of victim during trial for
interracial rape in which victim is accused of being racist).
39. For a statutory proposal aimed at deflecting the attention from the victim, see Cynthia
Ann Wicktom, Comment; Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the
Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 429-30 (1988) (emphasizing proof of
use of force and shifting burden of proving consent on defendant).
40. E.g., in a recent Florida rape trial, the jury foreman admitted that the jury acquitted
the defendant because the victim's clothing-a tank top and a short skirt with no underwear-
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on the beach 41 or to enter an apartment with the defendant, and how
much she had to drink. A defense attorney can aggressively interrogate
the witness, using this kind of evidence rather than evidence of past sex-
ual behavior to create the impression that the witness is the one on trial.
And jurors can take this sort of evidence and use it prejudicially, acquit-
ting the defendant even where a rape has occurred.42
In Thelma and Louise, Louise takes the law into her own hands and
shoots Thelma's rapist.43 She acts out of cynicism, despair and anger
borne of personal experience: years ago, she was raped and, it is implied,
she went through a painful and disillusioning trial.' They assume that
the rapist would not have been convicted. But why not? Why doesn't
the rape shield rule achieve its intended effect and encourage Thelma to
report the rape (and Louise to forgo vigilantism)? The problem is not
evidence of past sexual behavior. Thelma has been involved with only
one man since she was fourteen years old. The problem in her case is the
situation surrounding this event: she drank excessively, she smiled at her
rapist and engaged in conversation with him, she danced with him, she
willingly accompanied him into the parking lot. As Thelma puts it,
"They would have all made out like I'd asked for it."
The anticipated humiliation and futility of the trial is no mere plot
device. Current newspapers are cluttered with stories about rape trials in
which facts of this kind are used to insinuate that women are lying or
unworthy of protection and that the defendants do not deserve prison.
For example, the St. John's University rape trial in New York City re-
suggested that she "asked for it." Rape Guilty Plea, After Acquittal, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1989,
at B21. The rapist subsequently pled guilty to a rape charge in another state. Id.
41. This is the factual circumstance of the William Kennedy Smith case, which the media
have covered extensively. See, e.g., infra note 46. Commentators frequently discuss this case
as if a decision to go for a walk with a person creates a strong inference of consent to sexual
intercourse or as if the law should withhold protection from those who voluntarily engage in
"risky" behavior (with "risk" defined very broadly).
42. See LAFREE, supra note 18, at 217-18 (study of rape jurors).
43. The moral and legal context of the film is muddied by the murder: it is not simply that
Thelma cannot hope for a rape conviction anymore but that Louise quite justly faces a murder
charge. (There is no valid claim of self-defense here, though Thelma suggests making such a
claim, adding "It's almost the truth.") Thelma wants to go to the police at first, and Louise
talks her out of it, on the ground that Thelma's story will not be believed. Thelma could,
however, simply have declined to report the rape, as most rape victims do. She did not need to
become an outlaw. It is only in following Louise, who does need to fear arrest, that Thelma
becomes implicated in other crimes.
44. The film never more than alludes to this past event. The viewer is left to imagine
Louise's past experience, which, in the absence of particularized information, tends to become
a composite of all the stories of rape and rape trials one has ever heard. Interpretations of this
film vary in part because each viewer must construct the story of Louise's rape and trial
experience.
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suited in acquittal based in part on evidence the victim displayed a ro-
mantic interest in one of the defendants and drank a large amount of
liquor (albeit under pressure from one of the defendants).45 In the case
of three University of Minnesota basketball players tried in Madison,
Wisconsin, there was evidence that the alleged victim accompanied the
defendant to a hotel room where she was told there was a party.4 6 Even
given the admitted incidence of group sex, the jury accepted the defense
of consent.47 And the case involving William Kennedy Smith has led to
an immense amount of public discussion about the victim, focusing on
her drinking and her interest in socializing with the defendant. 4 A su-
permarket tabloid even featured a cover photograph of a blue brassiere
and the headline "This bra could save Kennedys-Willie Smith's lawyer
drops rape bombshell."'49
V.
The way people think about the evidence they hear is more impor-
tant than any rule. Consider how filmgoers saw and interpreted the
events the camera allowed them to "witness" in Thelma and Louise."
We see Thelma ordering a drink in a crowded roadside bar, engaging in
conversation with a man (Harlan), agreeing to dance with him. We see
Harlan, on hearing Louise say they were about to leave, aggressively spin
the drunken Thelma, and then, when she predictably sickens, lead her
45. See, eg., Lorrin Anderson, Boyz N St. John's; Minority Dominated Jury Acquits St.
John's University White Male College Students of Sex Abuse Charge by Jamaican Female Stu-
dent, NAT'L REV., Aug. 26, 1991, at 22.
46. This case is discussed at length in Bumiller, supra note 38.
47. Id. at 79.
48. See, eg., Hugh Davies, Kennedy Clan under Siege, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 2, 1991,
at 3; Paul Richter, Smith Case Jury Likely to Focus on Character; Rape Trial: Personas of
Accuser and Accused May be More Crucial Than High-Tech Evidence, Legal Maneuvers, L.A.
TiMEs, Nov. 4, 1991, at A4.
49. Why Willie's Pinning His Hopes on a Bra, STAR, Nov. 19, 1991, at 42.
50. A film is not a true life event: seeing a crime on film differs from witnessing a crime in
real life. Not only is it based on a writer's screenplay and performed by actors, a mere imita-
tion of life, but it is also shot, lit and cut according to the manipulative methods of filmmaking.
If we happen upon an event in real life, no close-ups drag our attention to a specific facial
expression or a gun in a hand. No human actor has structured our point of view (though
contact with numerous human actors has shaped our minds and thus has an impact on what
we notice and focus on and how we react to, interpret and talk about an event). It is our
choice or the accident of our physical position that determines whether our eyes linger on the
victim, scrutinize the movements of some other participant, scan the surroundings for other
evidence, or look away. By contrast, a film-maker controls what portions of the scene we see,
which characters we follow and whose construction of the events we hear. Butjurors in a trial
do not witness the crime themselves, they listen to witnesses, who, like filmmakers, present a
point of view and can distort reality in any number of ways.
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into the parking lot purportedly for "air." We then witness Harlan's
attack on Thelma.
Reading a large number of reviews of Thelma and Louise, I was
struck by how consistently filmgoer-witnesses reached the conclusion
that Harlan did not rape Thelma, but merely attempted it. Words like
"would-be rapist" or "trying to rape" appear with disconcerting fre-
quency."1 To my knowledge, not a single reviewer said unequivocally
that Harlan raped Thelma, though two did say that he "was raping"
Thelma when Louise stopped him at gunpoint. 2 Given the sustained
51. See Nigel Andrews, The Western Reinventedfor Women, FiN. TIMES, July 11, 1991, at
11 ("Thelma is all but raped by a redneck customer .... ); Jay Carr, "Thelma & Louise"
Buddies with Heart, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1991, at 45 ("the vicious would-be rapist");
Mike Clark, "Thelma"Makes Road to Hilarity Harrowing Ride, USA TODAY, May 25, 1991,
at ID ("At a stop-off honky-tonk, Thelma gets looped, then nearly raped by her evening-long
dance partner. . . . rape was prevented by Louise's gun-wielding threats."); Jack Garner,
"Thelma and Louise"--Rich Movie Triumph, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, May 21, 1991 ("A
few moments of dancing escalate into an ugly, violent confrontation with a would-be rapist
...."); Susan Henderson, On the Run in a 1966 Thunderbird Convertible, ORIGIN UNIVERSAL
NEWS SERVICES LIMITED, July 3, 1991 ("When Louise goes out to the car park and finds the
man trying to rape her friend .... "); Brian D. Johnson, Feminist Fast Lane, MACLEAN'S,
May 27, 1991, at 64 ("After making her drunk and dizzy, he takes her outside and tries to rape
her on the hood of a parked car."); Stanley Kauffmann, Thelma and Louise, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, July 1, 1991, at 28 ("[S]he stops the rape attempt at gun point .... ); Jack Kroll,
Back on the Road Again, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1991, at 59 ("But at their first pit stop a local
superpig tries to rape Thelma .... ); Craig Maclnnis, The Real Guys: Thelma & Louise
Raises Question Why Recent Movies Can Only Show Women Making Progress by Making Men
Look Like Idiots, THE TORONTO STAR, June 22, 1991, at Fl ("the lovely outlaws shoot a
would-be rapist dead"); Mars-Jones, supra note 5, at 18 ("The red-neck tries to rape Thelma
and Louise intervenes with a gun."); M.S. Mason, The Movie "Thelma & Louise" Isn't Just
About Trashing Men, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1, 1991, at 11 ("Before the first day
ends, Thelma is beaten and nearly raped, and Louise ... has saved her friend at gunpoint and
then shot the would-be rapist as he verbally abuses her."); Richard Schickel, Gender Bender; A
White-Hot Debate Rages over Whether Thelma & Louise Celebrates Liberated Females, Male
Bashers-or Outlaws, TIME, June 24, 1991, at 52 ("follows her to the parking lot and almost
succeeds in raping her... Louise kills the would-be rapist."); John Simon, Thelma and Lou-
ise, NAT'L REV., July 8, 1991, at 48 ("Provocative as she is, she gets not air, but attempted
rape."); David Sterritt, A Driving Movie With Women at the Wheel, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 17, 1991, at 11 ("He takes Thelma outside and tries to rape her... "); Clifford
Terry, "Thelma & Louise" Rowdy Road Trip Slowed by Plot Holes, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1991,
at H ("[A] lout who assaults and tries to rape Thelma.. . ."); Bruce Williamson, Thelma and
Louise; Movie Reviews, PLAYBOY, May 1991, at 58 ("[T]hese newly liberated members of the
fair sex are up to their eyebrows in near rape . .. .") (emphases added).
52. See Catherine Dunphy, Thelma & Louise's Excellent Adventure, TORONTO STAR, May
24, 1991, at D1 ("Louise shoots a man who was raping Thelma in the parking lot of an Arkan-
sas roadhouse...."); Jack Matthews, On The Run With "Thelma, Louise," NEWSDAY, May
24, 1991, at 87 ("It's hard to believe that two women, even two as simple and unsophisticated
as Thelma and Louise, would panic and head for Mexico after shooting a man who was furi-
ously raping one of them."). Note that both of these reviews use the expression "was raping"
which also draws attention to the unfinished nature of the action. This terminology, like the
use of the "attempt" language set out in the preceding footnote, suggests that viewers instinc-
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close-up of the sides of the two bodies and a good deal of suggestive
manipulation of bodies and clothing and Thelma's explicit statement,
"He was raping me," there is, I would think, no basis for downgrading
the event to a mere rape attempt. 3 The movie reviewers were only pur-
porting to describe what they saw and did not, like jurors, need to give
Harlan the benefit of reasonable doubt. 4 Indeed, since the movie takes
Thelma and Louise's point of view one would think that reviewers would
be more inclined to accept Thelma's characterization of the event than a
juror would.
Many of the reviewers' other statements suggest the kind of thinking
that leads jurors to construe evidence about the event in question against
the alleged victim. John Simon wrote that Harlan "gets the somewhat
drunk Thelma to dance with him in complete, newly emancipated aban-
don."'55 This statement seems to imply that Thelma has opened herself
up to sexual activity or at least has sent a strong message of availability.
The next statement intensifies this implication:
You'd think that a woman, even a quasi-runaway, would not
trust a man who dances with a beer bottle in one hand poking
his partner's shoulderblades, but Thelma does, and even fol-
lows him out into the parking lot for a breath of sobering air.
Provocative as she is, she gets not air, but attempted rape. 6
After this excessive foray into victim-blaming, Simon has the ob-
tuseness to wonder why Thelma does not go to the police.5 7
Rita Kempley places the blame squarely on the victim: "Thelma is
the scatterbrain who gets them into trouble when she insists on stopping
tively take the defendant's perspective: since Louise stopped him, Harlan did not commit
rape. From the victim's perspective (which the text of statutory criminal law also takes), rape
occurs on penetration (in the words of many statutes, "however slight").
53. One never actually sees penetration, but one would probably not see it in real life. The
visibility of penetration produced in hard-core pornography takes some doing. And reviewers
could scarcely expect such a sight in an R-rated Hollywood film. It may be that the reviewers
fail to find rape because they care about Thelma and wish a better outcome into existence. But
that caring takes the form of disbelieving her. Another possibility should be considered. Per-
haps the reviewers are not so bad at finding facts and they have merely transformed the law.
Louise's interruption of Harlan's activity: her gun suddenly appears at the base of his skull,
and he must pull away from Thelma to confront Louise. Perhaps the reviewers feel they have
witnessed only an "attempt" because his goal was not fully attained.
54. A fastidiously accurate reviewer could avoid concluding rape or attempted rape with
other language, for example "Thelma is brutally assaulted." See Buddy Can You Spare a
Dame?, Times Newspapers, Ltd., Sunday Times, July 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, Currnt file.
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for a drink at a roadside honky-tonk. A drunken dance-floor flirtation
turns suddenly ugly....,, Similarly, Janet Maslin acquits Harlan and
astonishingly trivializes the event with the following statement: "Out for
a weekend's fishing trip, mischievously stealing away from Thelma's hus-
band and Louise's boyfriend, the two heroines first get into trouble in an
Arkansas honky-tonk, where a man who makes a pass at Thelma mis-
takes her high spirits and alcoholic haze for sexual availability." 59 Like
Maslin, Richard Schickel views Harlan as the victim of a mistake and
Thelma as the one who led him into his mistake. He writes: "On the
way, [Thelma and Louise] stop at a roadhouse for a drink. One of its
resident lounge lizards mistakes Thelma's naive flirtatiousness for a
come-on, follows her to the parking lot and almost succeeds in raping
her."
6
To my eye, Harlan engages in egregiously predatory behavior: he
buys the women a second round of drinks, he sits down with them unin-
vited and makes ingratiating conversation emphasizing their physical ap-
pearance, he deliberately spins Thelma and makes her dizzy, then takes
advantage of her condition to lead her into isolation in the parking lot,
and he slugs her with his full strength and pins her against the hood of a
car. Thelma repeatedly says "no" and pleads with him ("I'm married.").
Harlan scarcely is the victim of mistake.
Despite the apparent sympathy and admiration many of these re-
viewers express for Thelma, one can easily imagine them as jurors focus-
ing on her behavior, finding it misguided, misleading and reckless, and
acquitting Harlan, contemptible though they may have found him. Only
in light of the hitting and bruising does conviction seem a real possibility.
In adding this decisive violence, the film distinctly weights the evidence
against Harlan. But one may rightly wonder what the reviewers would
have written if they had witnessed a rape without the dramatic slugging
or if they had merely heard a witness describe that sort of rape.61
58. Rita Kempley, "Thelma & Louise'" In the Hammer Lane, THE WASH. PosT, May 24,
1991, at B1. Kempley avoids mentioning the Harlan character or the rape in this early review
of the movie, so her statement could be attributed to a desire to keep its surprises intact.
59. Janet Maslin, Lay Off "Thelma and Louise," N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1991, § 2, at 11.
This review, interestingly enough, is a fierce defense of the film.
60. Schickel, supra note 51, at 52.
61. On the dismissive treatment "simple rape" receives from police, prosecutors and juries,
see ESTRICH, supra note 12 at 4-7. If filmgoers were more attuned to the realities of rape, the
film would have been more provocative and meaningful without this additional violence. (The
average filmgoer is probably unusually inured to compelled sex on the screen: rape is fre-
quently depicted without being called rape or even recognized as bad. See, e.g., GONE WITH
THE WIND (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939)). The makers of Thelma and Louise seemed to
have realized that they would need to beat the audience over the head with the fact that this
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VI.
Does the rape shield rule matter? Perhaps it matters the way a film
or a famous rape case matters. It is a cultural phenomenon that shapes
the minds of the judges and juries who decide the outcomes of trials. The
rule represents an attempt to control the information a jury will hear and
to rein in their tendencies to decide rape cases by judging the victim, but
it cannot in one grand gesture change those tendencies. Judges who re-
sist the conclusions that underlie the rule can find their way out from
underneath even its strictly worded prescriptions. Juries who do not
share the mindset of the rule's legislators can, even when the rule is used
to bar evidence, find whatever way they can to judge the victim and not
the defendant.
But knowing that an impressive panel of legal experts, endorsed by a
large politically responsible institution, has found the evidence irrelevant
can influence judges to abandon or modify their beliefs, ideas and pat-
terns of reasoning. If their minds do change, they may willingly pro-
nounce this evidence irrelevant and thus incapable of triggering
constitutional protections and they may use all of their many discretion-
ary powers to deflect attention from the victim's behavior. Jurors too
may change, influenced by the decreased barrage of information about
the victim. If the evidence begins to focus on the culpability of the de-
fendant, they may lose the sense that it is just and fair to judge the vic-
tim. If their minds genuinely undergo this change, then the rule will
finally have its intended effect.
This process of change is disconcertingly slow and uncertain, partic-
ularly compared with the impressive (but deceptive) speed and clarity of
a new rule. It is in fact too slow and uncertain to offer much inspiration
to the individual victim who must make her own decision about whether
to respond to the law's outstretched hand. And so, daily, victims do turn
away and, even if they do not head over the precipice like Thelma and
Louise, they decline to take part in the public struggle of the courtroom.
But one may nevertheless continue to nurture the hope that enough will
respond to the law's overtures to allow this process of change to go for-
ward. And one can credit the modest step of enacting a rule with making
the courtroom a somewhat more bearable place for those courageous
volunteers.
was "real rape." A rape in which the only violence is the rape itself would not read as rape to
many viewers and the characters' reactions would have made no sense at all to them.
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